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Abstract
Does immigration reduce natives’ support for the welfare state? Ev-
idence from the European Social Survey (2002/2003) suggests a more
qualified relation. For Europe as a whole, there is only weak evidence
of a negative association between the perceived presence of immigrants
and natives’ support for the welfare state. However, this weak average
relationship masks considerable heterogeneity across countries.
We distinguish two channels through which immigration could affect
natives’ support for the welfare state: a pure dislike of immigrants and
concerns about the economic consequences of immigration. We find that
natives who hold both negative views react much more negatively to a
given perceived share of immigrants than natives who hold neither view.
However, there is no clear pattern concerning the relative importance
of the two channels.
Finally, we find that natives who hold either of these negative views
of immigrants tend to be less supportive of the welfare state indepen-
dently of the perceived presence of immigrants.
Keywords: welfare state, immigration, income redistribution, reciprocity, Eu-
ropean Social Survey
JEL codes: D31, D64, I3, Z13
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1 Introduction
Countries differ widely in many aspects of government spending and tax pol-
icy, in particular in their policies regarding redistribution and the welfare state.
Among the possible explanations for these differences, some emphasis has been
put lately on ethnic, cultural, or linguistic fractionalization as a deterrent to
redistributive policies. A number of empirical studies have explored this link
between ethnic fractionalization and redistribution.1 For example, Alesina and
Glaeser (2004) show that countries with greater ethnic diversity have signif-
icantly lower levels of redistribution as a share of GDP; they estimate that
“about 50 percent of the gap between the United States and Europe may be
due to racial fractionalization” (p. 134).
Over the last four decades, Europe has experienced large-scale immigration,
often from countries with cultural, religious, or ethnic backgrounds that are
quite different from those of the native population. Alesina and Glaeser (2004,
11) argue that this inflow will affect the European welfare state: “one natural
implication of our conclusion that fractionalization reduces redistribution is
that if Europe becomes more heterogeneous due to immigration, ethnic divi-
sions will be used to challenge the generous welfare state.”
We use survey data for 22 European countries from the 2002/2003 round of
the European Social Survey to investigate the link between immigration and
support for the welfare state. We want to find out (1) how the perceived
presence of immigrants is related to natives’ support for the welfare state, and
how this relationship varies (2) with natives’ attitudes towards immigrants and
(3) across countries. The specificity of the present study lies in its emphasis
on parameter heterogeneity and in the use of European instead of U.S. or
Canadian data.
Our main result is that, for Europe as a whole, the association between the
perceived presence of immigrants and natives’ support for the welfare state
is weak at best. We do find some evidence that natives who perceive the
share of immigrants in the population to be high tend to be less supportive of
the welfare state. But the association is very weak and not even statistically
significant for two of our three dependent variables. To give an idea of the
magnitude, an increase in the perceived share of immigrants of one standard
1See the surveys by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and by Stichnoth and Van der Straeten
(2008).
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deviation (about 16 percentage points) is associated with a decrease in the
probability of supporting the welfare state of about one percentage point.
This is small compared to the associations we find for other covariates such as
income or education.
However, although we find only weak evidence for a negative association be-
tween immigration and natives’ support for the welfare state in general, it may
well be that a negative association does exist for certain sub-groups of natives.
In a second step we therefore interact the variables measuring the actual or
perceived presence of immigrants with variables measuring natives’ attitudes
towards immigrants. Exploring this parameter heterogeneity is made possible
by the rich set of such attitudinal variables in the European Social Survey.
We classify these variables into two categories to capture two broad channels
through which attitudes towards immigrants may be related to the support
for the welfare state. The first channel is one of pure taste or “differential
altruism.” If natives feel less close to immigrants than to other natives (or
even actively dislike immigrants), they may be less willing to help them through
redistribution and the welfare state. Whereas this first channel is about what
immigrants are (at least in the perception of natives), the second channel is
about what they do (again as perceived by natives). In particular, we are
interested in how natives view the economic role of immigrants in general and
their contribution to the welfare state in particular. We suspect that natives
who believe that immigrants take undue advantage of the welfare state will
react differently to a given share of immigrants in the population.2 That
such considerations of fairness affect people’s support for redistribution has
been amply demonstrated in the literature; for example, Fong et al. (2006)
state that in general “people are willing to help the poor, but they withdraw
support when they perceive that the poor may cheat or fail to cooperate by
not trying hard enough to be self-sufficient and morally upstanding” (p. 3).
As expected, we find that the association between the perceived share of im-
migrants and support for the welfare state is most negative for natives who
both dislike immigrants and express concern about the economic consequences
of immigration. By contrast, the association is positive for those natives who
2In the experimental studies on the effects of ethnic diversity on trust and trustworthi-
ness, these two channels are referred to as preference-based and statistical discrimination;
see Glaeser et al. (2000), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004),
Habyarimana et al. (2006), Haile et al. (2006), Bornhorst et al. (2006), Falk and Zehnder
(2007).
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view immigration positively along both dimensions. There is no clear evidence
concerning the relative importance of the two channels: often, the parameter
estimates for the two intermediate types are not significantly different from
another.
When we include the two channels also as main effects (instead of interacting
them with the perceived share of immigrants), we find that attitudes towards
immigration and attitudes towards the welfare state are strongly associated,
but that this association is little affected by the (perceived) presence of immi-
grants.
A third contribution of our paper is to look at differences across countries
within Europe. We find that the small average effect masks considerable het-
erogeneity across countries. However, the general result is preserved: the
practical significance of the association between the perceived presence of im-
migrants and natives’ support for the welfare state is small even in the countries
for which the estimated coefficients are largest.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we briefly review
previous evidence. Then, in section 3, we set up a model to illustrate how the
share of immigrants and the two channels of altruism and economic considera-
tions may interact to influence natives’ demand for redistribution. In sections
4 and 5 we present the data and discuss the specification. Section 6 presents
the main results as well as a number of robustness checks. Section 7 concludes.
2 Previous studies
As noted in the introduction, most studies on the effects of immigration and
ethnic diversity on attitudes towards the welfare state use data from the U.S.,
most often from the General Social Survey.
A first finding from these studies is that in the U.S., the support for the welfare
state differs by “race.” Alesina et al. (2001), Luttmer (2001), and Lind (2007)
all find that blacks tend to be much more supportive of welfare spending than
whites, even controlling for a number of observable characteristics. A recent
article by Keely and Tan (2008) uses classification and regression trees to detect
homogenous subgroups with respect to attitudes towards welfare spending and
income redistribution. Applying these techniques on data from the General
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Social Survey for the period 1978–2000, Keely and Tan confirm that the race
of the respondent is important for classifying people with respect to attitudes
towards the welfare state.
Second, in the U.S. attitudes towards blacks are an important predictor of
attitudes towards the welfare state. Using data from the 1986 National Elec-
tion Study, the 1994 General Social Survey, and the 1991 National Race and
Politics Study, Gilens (1995, 1996, 1999) shows that racial stereotypes are im-
portant predictors of the support for welfare spending among white Americans.
Also using data from the General Social Survey, Alesina et al. (2001) confirm
Gilens’ findings that racial attitudes are correlated with support for welfare
spending: whites who believe that blacks are lazy tend to be less supportive
of welfare spending, and whites who have had a black person over for dinner
tend to be more supportive. Lind (2007) also shows evidence from the General
Social Survey. For the period 1972–2002, he confirms that white respondents
who do not mind having or actually have had an African-American at home
tend to be more supportive of welfare spending. For the shorter time span
from 1996 to 2002, Lind shows that blacks who feel closer to blacks tend to be
more supportive, and blacks who feel closer to whites less supportive of welfare
spending. For whites the interaction terms have the expected (opposite) signs,
but are insignificant.
The picture is less clear concerning the relationship between the regional popu-
lation share of Blacks and the support for the welfare state. On the one hand,
Luttmer (2001) shows— using data from the General Social Survey for the
years 1972 to 1993—that in the U.S. people are more likely to express support
for welfare spending if they live in a neighborhood where the share of people
of their own race among welfare recipients is high. This is true whatever the
economic situation of the respondents, even among wealthy people who have
only a very small risk of being welfare recipients themselves. On the other
hand, Alesina et al. (2001), who also use data from the General Social Sur-
vey, find that support among whites is not significantly associated with the
share of blacks in the population of the respondent’s state. This difference
with Luttmer’s results may be due to the fact that Luttmer looks at shares of
blacks among welfare recipients and not in the population as a whole. More-
over, Soroka et al. (2004) find for Canada that “the link [between regional
ethnic diversity and support for social programs] is weak at best” (p. 50);
“moving from 100% majority to 50% majority leads to a decrease in aggregate
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support for unemployment and welfare of about .0025%” (p. 51).
3 Model
We assume that individuals’ preferences for redistribution derive from con-
siderations involving their own post-tax income, the average post-tax income
of natives in the economy (denoted by cN), and the average post-tax income
of immigrants in the economy (denoted by cI). More specifically, individuals
evaluate the redistribution policy by computing the following weighted sum:
c+ αNpNcN + αIpIcI
where pN (respectively pI) is the proportion of natives (respectively immi-
grants) in the economy, αN (respectively αI) is the weight given to natives’
per capita post-tax income (respectively immigrants’ post-tax income), with
the assumption that αN ≥ αI .
In our model, redistribution takes the very simple form of a basic income,
which is financed through a tax that is proportional to (exogenous) income.
b = b(t) = tw,
where b is the basic income and w is the average pre-tax income in the economy.
With these assumptions, we can derive an individual’s indirect preferences for
the tax rate t:
V = tw + (1− t)w + αNpN [tw + (1− t)wN ] + αIpI [tw + (1− t)wI ]
= w + αNpNwN + αIpIwI + t [(w − w) + αNpN (w − wN) + αIpI (w − wI)]
where wN (respectively wI) is natives’ pre-tax income (respectively immigrants’
pre-tax income). Since
w = pNwN + pIwI ,
w − wN = pI (wI − wN)
w − wI = pN (wN − wI)
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the indirect utility from taxation can be written as
V = [w + αNpNwN + αIpIwI ]
+t [(w − w)− pI(1− pI) (αN − αI) (wN − wI)]
We assume that all individuals correctly perceive the average income in the
economy, w, but that they have different perceptions regarding pI and (wN − wI)
(we only require that these perceptions about natives’ income, immigrants’ in-
come and the share of immigrants satisfy the equality w = pNwN + pIwI).
We conclude from this expression that the propensity to favor redistribution
decreases with the individual’s pre-tax income, w, and with the expression
pI(1− pI) (αN − αI) (wN − wI) .
Since
∂V
∂t∂pI
= −(1− 2pI) (αN − αI) (wN − wI) , and pI < 1/2
the propensity to favor redistribution depends on the interaction of two vari-
ables: whether the individual likes immigrants or not (through the αN − αI
term) and whether he thinks that immigrants are poorer than natives (through
the wN−wI term). The model predicts that the sign of the variable “perceived
share of immigrants” is ambiguous: it depends on the perception of the relative
income of immigrants versus natives. If an individual believes that immigrants
are poorer than natives, his demand for redistribution should decrease with his
perception of the number of immigrants in the country. And the effect, always
negative, should be larger in absolute value the more he dislikes immigrants
(αN − αI large). On the other hand, if an individual believes that immigrants
are richer than natives, his demand for redistribution should increase with his
perception of the number of immigrants in the country. And the effect, always
positive, should be larger the more he dislikes immigrants (αN − αI large).
Note that in the limit case where the individual makes no difference between
the consumption of natives and immigrants in his utility function (αN = αI),
his preferences for redistribution should not depend on his perception of the
share of immigrants in the economy.
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4 Data
4.1 The dataset
We use about 23000 observations for 22 countries from the first round of the
European Social Survey (ESS); the data were collected in 2002 and 2003.3
Immigration was one of the special topics of the first round of the ESS, which
therefore contains a large number of questions on attitudes towards and beliefs
about immigration (see Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2003) for a description
of the ESS immigration module.) In particular, the ESS contains a question on
the perceived share of immigrants in the population, and a series of questions
on attitudes towards immigration.
4.2 The dependent variables
We measure support for the welfare state using three different questions.
A first question asks whether “the government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels.” Our second dependent variable measures the
respondent’s support for equal opportunities: “Here we briefly describe some
people. Please read each description [and] tick the box on each line that shows
how much each person is or is not like you. He (she) thinks it is important
that every person in the world should be treated equally. He (she) believes
everyone should have equal opportunities in life.” Finally, we use a variable
that measures the respondent’s support for the poor: “To be a good citizen,
how important would you say it is for a person to support people who are
worse off than themselves?”
Figure 1 shows how the answers are distributed in the sample. Each of the
three statements receives considerable support.
To simplify the presentation of the estimated marginal effects, we dichotomize
the variables and estimate binary instead of ordered response models. The
dummy variables equals one if a respondent answered one of the categories
3The countries are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark,
Spain, Finland, France, U.K., Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia. See the appendix for a more
detailed description of the dataset.
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Figure 1: Distribution of the three dependent variables
above the neutral midpoint. For “reduce income differences,” these are the
two highest categories. There is no midpoint for “equal opportunites,” but
we choose to also group the two highest categories together. For the variable
“helping poor people,” we group the five highest categories together.
4.3 The perceived and actual presence of immigrants
Whereas previous studies have used the actual share of immigrants or ethnic
minorities in the population or among welfare recipients, the European Social
Survey allows us to use the perceived share of immigrants in the population as
well. Respondents are asked: “out of every 100 people living in [country], how
many do you think were born outside [country]?”
We believe that it is an advantage to have data on the perceived share, since
it allows us to use variation between individuals, whereas previous studies
could only use the much smaller variation in the actual share between regions.
Also, it is arguably the perceived share and not the actual share that affects
individuals’ attitudes.
There is considerable variation in the perceived share of immigrants. The
mean of the variable is 19.6, with a standard deviation of 17.4. Figure 2
shows a kernel density estimate; despite the smoothing, the spikes at focal
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values such as 10, 20, or 30 percent are still visible. In general, the variation
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Figure 2: Kernel density estimate of the perceived share of immigrants
in the perceived share of immigrants results from two sources: differences in
the actual share across countries, and errors of perception. Since we estimate
our models including country dummies (which capture, among other things,
differences in the institutions of the welfare state and in the actual share of
immigrants), all the variation that we exploit in this paper stems from errors
of perception.
As figure 3 shows, natives in all countries tend to overestimate the share of
immigrants: the average perceived share lies everywhere above the 45 degree
line.
We have run an OLS regression to explore the correlates of the perceived share.
The results are reported in table 5 in the appendix. As expected, we find that
more educated people perceive the true share more accurately. More surpris-
ingly perhaps, women tend to report a higher perceived share. As already
suggested by the graph, the average perceived share tends to increase almost
one-by-one with the actual share. However, there are considerable differences
between countries in the error of perception. For instance, French and British
respondents stand out for overestimating the true share by particularly large
amounts. These country differences are probably to some extent driven by the
respondents understanding terms like immigrant, foreigner, ethnic minority
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Figure 3: Relationship between the actual and the average perceived share
etc. differently, despite the careful design of the European Social Survey.
When using the perceived share of immigrants as a regressor in our models for
the support for the welfare state, we always control for the correlates listed in
table 5, which can be expected to have a direct effect on the support for the
welfare state. Nevertheless, the perceived share may still be endogenous. Our
results should therefore best be interpreted as descriptive.
4.4 Attitudes towards immigrants: the taste channel
and the economic channel
One of the contributions of this paper is to distinguish between a taste channel
and an economic channel when studying the relationship between attitudes
towards immigrants and attitudes towards the welfare state.
Recall from the model in section 3 that the demand for redistribution (mea-
sured by the tax rate t in the model) will depend on the weight with which
natives’ and immigrants’ income enter an individual’s utility function (the term
αN − αI in equation (3)) and on the perceived difference in average income
between natives and immigrants (wN − wI).
The first round of the European Social Survey, with its rich array of questions
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on attitudes towards immigrants, allows to measure these channels in a number
of ways.
We choose to measure αN −αI (the taste channel) by the question “how much
would you mind or not mind if [someone from a different race or ethnic group
from most people in this country] married a close relative of yours?” There
are eleven answer categories, from not mind at all to mind a lot, plus a “don’t
know” category that we code as missing.
To measure wN − wI (the economic channel), our preferred question asks for
the belief about immigrants’ fiscal contribution: “most people who come to
live here work and pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On
balance, do you think people who come here take out more than they put in
or put in more than they take out?” There are again eleven answer categories,
from generally take out more to generally put in more, plus a “don’t know”
category coded as missing.4
We dichotomize both variables: the answer categories from 6 to 10 are recoded
as 1, the remaining categories are recoded as 0. The interaction of the two
binary variables creates four mutually exclusive types, the distribution of which
is shown in figure 4.
First, there are natives who say they would not mind if an immigrant married
into their family and who believe that immigrants’ fiscal contribution is positive
(we abbreviate this as “both positive” in figure 4). For these individuals,
αN − αI = 0 and wN − wI < 0. Hence ∂V∂t∂pI = 0, that is, the share of
immigrants in the population should not affect the demand for redistribution.
The second category are natives who say they would mind an immigrant marry-
ing into their family but believe that immigrants’ fiscal contribution is positive
(abbreviated as “minds immigrant relatives” in the figure). For these individ-
uals, αN − αI > 0 and wN − wI < 0. Hence ∂V∂t∂pI > 0, that is, the greater the
share of immigrants in the population, the greater the demand for redistribu-
tion. The idea is that these natives dislike immigrants but believe them to be
net payers, so by asking for more redistribution they believe that the burden
will fall on immigrants whereas natives will benefit.
Third, there are natives who say they would not mind if an immigrant mar-
ried into their family but who believe that immigrants’ fiscal contribution is
4In section 6.3, we check that our results are robust to the choice of variables for the two
channels.
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negative (abbreviated as “thinks immigrants take out more”). For this group,
αN − αI = 0 and wN − wI > 0. Hence ∂V∂t∂pI is again zero because these
individuals do not make a distinction between immigrants and natives.
Finally, there are those natives who would not want an immigrant marrying
into their family and who believe that immigrants’ fiscal contribution is nega-
tive (abbreviated as “both negative”). Here, αN − αI > 0 and wN − wI > 0.
Hence ∂V
∂t∂pI
< 0, that is, the greater the perceived share of immigrants in the
population, the weaker the support for redistribution.
0.36
0.10
0.33
0.21
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
Both positive
Minds immigrant relatives
Thinks immigrants take out more
Both negative
Figure 4: Shares of the four types in the sample
4.5 Control variables
We control for a standard set of demographic and socio-economic characteris-
tics: age, age squared, gender, monthly household net income (in 9 categories),
years of education, dummy variables for being unemployed or self-employed,
household size, a dummy for having a child living in the household, marital
status (in five categories), and dummies for living in a city, suburb, rural area,
etc. Except in one robustness test in which we use the actual share of immi-
grants (for which there is no within-country variation), we also include country
dummies. Table 4 in the appendix shows summary statistics for these control
variables. Notice that we restrict our sample to natives and therefore do not
control for immigration status.
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5 Specification
The dependent variables have several ordered categories, which would call for
an ordered response model. As mentioned, however, in order to keep the
presentation of the estimated marginal effects simple, we dichotomize the de-
pendent variables and estimate probit models.
The probit model can be derived from a latent variable model. Assume that
individual i’s true, unobserved attitude towards the welfare state can be mod-
elled as
y∗i = x
′
iβ + εi (1)
The vector xi contains the share of immigrants in a country (as perceived
by individual i), the control variables described in the last section, and an
intercept that is allowed to vary across countries. We assume that the error
terms εi follows a standard normal distribution, and that they are independent
across, but not within countries. The asymptotic standard errors that we
report below are therefore adjusted for clustering at the country level.
The answers yi that we observe in the survey are assumed to be a function of
the true, unobserved attitude. More precisely,
Yi =
{
1, if y∗i > 0;
0, otherwise.
(2)
That is, we model the probability that respondent i answers “very much like
me” or “like me” to the question on the importance of equal opportunities as
P (yi = 1 | xi) = Φ(xiβ) (3)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal
distribution.
We are interested in the marginal effects
∂P (y = 1 | x)
∂xj
(4)
for a continuous regressor xj and
P (y = 1 | x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, 1)− P (y = 1 | x1, x2, . . . , xk−1, 0) (5)
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for a discrete regressor xk. We report these marginal effects at the sample
mean.
We first estimate the model for the whole sample; that is, we pool the ob-
servations and constrain all parameters to be the same across countries. The
observations are weighted using the design weights and the population size
weights provided by the European Social Survey. We then go on to explore
the heterogeneity in the association between the perceived share of immigrants
and support for the welfare state by allowing the coefficient on the perceived
share to vary by country. Finally, we do a number of checks to explore the
robustness of our results.
6 Results
6.1 Whole sample
Table A.4.3 reports estimated marginal effects (at the sample mean) for our
probit models. All observations are pooled, and we constrain parameters to be
the same across countries. There are nine columns, three for each dependent
variable. The first column for each dependent variable corresponds to a model
with individual controls and country dummies. The second column allows
the coefficient on the perceived share to vary by the four subgroups described
above. The third column constrains this coefficient to be the same for all
individuals (as in the first column), but we allow the intercept to differ between
these four types. The table reports results for selected variables only. Full
estimation results are available from the authors upon request.
6.1.1 The average association between the perceived share and sup-
port for the welfare state is weak
A first lesson from table A.4.3 is that for the 22 European countries as a whole
we find only very weak evidence for a negative relationship between immigra-
tion and natives’ support for the welfare state. The estimated marginal effects
for the three dependent variables are -0.0004, 0.00072, and -0.0007, of which
only the last (for “help the poor”) is statistically significantly different from
zero. Even this last marginal effect is very small in size, however. When con-
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trolling for demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the individual
and when allowing for country-specific intercepts, an increase in the perceived
share of immigrants of one standard deviation (about 16 percentage points) is
associated with a decrease in the probability of wanting to help the poor of
about one percentage point. To put this into perspective, recall from figure
1 above that about 82 percent of respondents declare that it is important to
help the poor. Also, the estimated marginal effect of the perceived share of im-
migrants is much smaller than the association with, say, income or education.
For instance, one standard deviation increase in the length of education (i.e.,
about four years) is associated with an increase in the support for equal op-
portunities by about four percentage points (not reported in the table). That
is, measured in terms of standard deviations, the association with education is
four times as strong as the association with the perceived share of immigrants.
6.1.2 The association differs with respect to personal dislike of im-
migrants and economic concerns about immigration
Now it may be that this small average effects masks differences between sub-
groups. In column 2 of each model, we therefore interact the perceived share
with attitudes towards immigrants. As noted above, we would like to find out
whether people who personally dislike immigrants (measured here by a ques-
tion on whether the respondent would mind an immigrant marrying into his or
her family) or people who are worried about the economic consequences of im-
migration (measured by a question about the fiscal contribution of immigrants)
react more negatively to a given perceived share.
We find that the association does indeed differ between people with different
views about immigration. For each of the three dependent variables, a Wald
test (not reported) rejects the null hypotheses that all four coefficients are
equal; another test shows that they are jointly (though not always individually)
different from zero.
As expected, the starkest contrast is between the two extreme categories. The
36% of the sample (cf. figure 4) who do not mind having an immigrant mar-
rying into their family and who do not think that the fiscal contribution of
immigrants is negative tend to be more supportive of the welfare state the
higher their perception of the share of immigrants in the population. By con-
trast, for the 21% of the sample who hold both negative views, the probability
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of supporting the welfare state is estimated to go down by 0.0023 percentage
points for the dependent variable “equal opportunity” and by 0.0015 percent-
age points for “helping the poor.” Still, even for this subgroup of natives who
hold the most negative views on immigrants, the perceived share of immigrants
is only rather weakly related to their support for the welfare state. Even with
a marginal effect of -0.0023 (the largest in absolute value that we find), an in-
crease in the perceived share of immigrants of one standard deviation (about 16
percentage points) is associated with a decrease in the probability of favouring
equal opportunities of only about 3.7 percentage points.
Although two of the marginal effects (“both channels” for “reduce income
differences” and “neither channel” for “help the poor”) are not statistically
significant taken by themselves, the difference between individuals who hold
neither view and individuals who hold both negative views is always statisti-
cally significant.5 By contrast, the data do not allow us to disentangle which
of the two channels is stronger. From the point estimates it seems that the
preference channel is more important for “equal opportunities,” while the eco-
nomic channel seems to matter more for “helping the poor,” but for neither
model is the difference between these two parameters statistically significant
(the p-values are 37.9, 27.8, and 40.0 percent).
6.1.3 The two channels matter by themselves, independently of the
perceived presence of immigrants
Finally, we include the two channels and their interaction as main effects (col-
umn 3 for each dependent variable). We find that attitudes towards immigrants
are important correlates of natives’ support for the welfare state: people who
hold negative views on immigrants tend to be less supportive of the welfare
state, and this is true for all three dependent variables. The estimated marginal
effects are jointly different from zero and, except for “help the poor,” we reject
the null hypothesis that they are all equal.
Many of the marginal effects are sizeable. For instance, for the dependent
variable “equal opportunities”, the belief that the fiscal contribution of immi-
5We use Wald tests to test for the equality of these two parameters. The values of the test
statistic are 52.4 for “equal opportunities,” 2.2 for “reduce income differences,” and 32.6 for
“help the poor.” The test statistic follows a χ2(1) distribution. For “equal opportunities”
and “help the poor” the null hypothesis of parameter equality is rejected at conventional
levels, for “reduce income differences” at a level of 13.8%.
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grants is negative is associated with a reduction in the response probability
of 7.2 percentage points. Not wanting immigrants to marry into one’s fam-
ily is even associated with a reduction of 12 percentage points, and holding
both negative views with a reduction of 15 percentage points in the response
probability.
Concerning the relative importance of the two channels, we find that the pref-
erence channel is more important than the economic channel for “equal oppor-
tunities”, whereas the reverse is true for “help the poor.” However, a Wald
test (not reported) shows that the difference is statistically significant only for
“equal opportunities.” For both these variables, holding both negative views
is, as expected, associated with even less support for the welfare state.
By contrast, for “reduce income differences” we find the peculiar result that
people who hold only the negative economic view tend to be less supportive
of reducing income differences than are people who hold both negative views.
For neither variable can we reject the null hypothesis that the marginal effect
of both channels is simply the sum of the two channels; that is, there is no
evidence of an interaction effect of the two channels.
The association with the perceived share shows the same pattern as in the first
column: there is no statistically significant association for “equal opportuni-
ties” and “reduce income differences,” and for “help the poor” the association
is, although statistically significant, very weak in practical terms.
In conclusion, the data suggest that for Europe as a whole attitudes towards
immigration and attitudes towards the welfare state are strongly associated,
but that this association is little affected by the (perceived) presence of immi-
grants.
6.2 Parameter heterogeneity across countries
So far, we have allowed our coefficient of interest to vary only with respect
to individual attitudes towards immigration. Next, we allow the coefficient
on the perceived share to differ across countries. As in the models above, we
also allow for country differences in the intercept. Due to the large number of
countries, we choose to present the main results graphically here; table 6 in
the appendix contains the estimation results on which the figures are based.
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The figures show estimated marginal effects from probit models. Each figure corresponds to a different dependent variab
The coefficient on the perceived share of immigrants is assumed to be country−specific.
All other parameters are constrained to be the same across countries.
Figure 5: Country differences in the association between the perceived share
and natives’ support for the welfare state
As figure 5 shows, the average marginal effect estimated above masks consid-
erable heterogeneity across countries, and this is true for all three dependent
variables. For “reduce income differences” the estimate based on a homoge-
nous marginal effect is .00072; once heterogeneity by country is allowed, the
estimates range from -0.004 for Portugal to 0.003 for Slovenia. For “equal op-
portunities”, the homogenous marginal effect is -0.0004, which masks a range
from -0.003 for Austria to 0.004 for Poland. Finally, for “help the poor” we
estimate -0.0007 for the homogenous marginal effect, and country estimates
that range from -0.002 for Italy to 0.002 for Norway. For each of the three
dependent variables, a Wald test (not reported) rejects the null hypothesis
that the coefficient of interest is the same across countries.
Concerning the size of the estimated marginal effects, the strongest negative as-
sociation that we find is the -0.004 for Portugal and for the dependent variable
“reduce income differences.” The perceived share of immigrants in Portugal
has a mean of 22.1 and a standard deviation of 19.2; our estimate therefore
implies that in Portugal an increase in the perceived share of immigrants of one
standard deviation is associated with a decrease in natives’ support for reduc-
ing income differences by 7.7 percentage points. To put this into perspective,
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86.1% of Portugese natives declare themselves in favour of the government
reducing income differences.
We believe that these country differences are an interesting finding, which sug-
gests that assuming homogenous parameters across geographical areas—while
perhaps justified in previous studies that use U.S. or Canadian data—masks
important differences across European countries in the relationship between
the perceived share of immigrants and natives’ support for the welfare state.
Explaining these country differences is left for future work; any explanation
would have to take into account that for some countries the sign of the esti-
mated coefficient differs between the three dependent variables (see figure 6,
which shows the same estimated marginal effects as figure 5, but now esti-
mates are gouped by country and not by dependent variable). In Germany,
for instance, natives tend to be more supportive of equal opportunities and
reducing income differences, but less supportive of helping the poor the higher
the perceived share of immigrants.
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The figure shows estimated marginal effects for the  perceived share of immigrants.
All other parameters are constrained to be the same across countries.
Equal opportunities
Reduce income
differences
Support the poor
Figure 6: Estimated marginal effects by country for all three dependent vari-
ables
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6.3 Robustness checks
We have done a number of tests to explore the robustness of our results.
First, we check whether our results are sensitive to how we measure the two
channels. As noted above, our preferred variable for the taste channel is a
question on whether the respondents would mind an immigrant marrying into
their families. As alternative measures, we use information on whether the re-
spondents have any immigrant friends, believe that immigrants undermine the
country’s culture, and whether they declare that there would be no members
of ethnic minorities in their ideal neighbourhood.
For the economic channel, our preferred variables asks about the fiscal contri-
bution of immigrants. Alternatively, we use information on whether respon-
dents believe that immigration is bad for the economy as a whole and whether
they find that unemployed immigrants should be made to leave. The wording
of these questions is given in the appendix.
Our robustness check consists of estimating our model for each of these 12
combinations of variables. To keep the presentation simple, we run this test
for the model in which parameters are assumed to be constant across countries
and regions. As figures 7, 8, and 9 (reported in the appendix) show, our main
findings are not sensitive to how we measure the channels. The association
between the perceived share of immigrants and natives’ support for redistribu-
tion is never very strong. Even for the type who holds both negative views, the
mean estimated marginal effect over the twelve models is 0.0004 for “reduce
income differences,” -0.002 for “equal opportunities,” and likewise -0.002 for
“help the poor.” Out of the 36 models (twelve combinations for each of the
three dependent variables) the strongest negative marginal effect is -0.0027.
There is clear evidence of parameter heterogeneity between the two most ex-
treme types: the association is positive for natives who hold both positive
views, and negative for those who hold both negative views. The dependent
variable “reduce income differences” constitutes an exception, though, at least
for the type that holds both negative attitudes. This last case set aside, we
find that the estimated marginal effects for the two extreme types are generally
significantly different from zero and hence from each other. By contrast, we
typically do not detect any statistically significant differences between the two
intermediate types.
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At the suggestion of a referee, we explore parameter heterogeneity with respect
to parents’ immigrant status: we interact the perceived share of immigrant
with dummies for whether the neither, one, or both parents were born abroad
(recall that respondents themselves are all natives in our sample). Table 2
shows the results of these estimates for each of the three depenent variables.
The first row corresponds to natives whose both parents were already born in
the country; rows 2 and 3 correspond to natives with one or two immigrant
parents, respectively. The table shows that the (weak) evidence for a negative
association between the perceived share of immigrants and natives support for
the welfare state is in fact exclusively driven by natives whose both parents
were already born in the country.
Table 2: All countries pooled, by parents’ immigrant status
Equal opp. Egalitarian Help the poor
Neither parent born abroad -.00076* .00069* -.00056*
(.00028) (.00031) (.00019)
One parent born abroad .00082 -.00023 .00015
(.00092) (.00037) (.00042)
Both parents born abroad .0014* .0006 .00036
(.00068) (.0005) (.00035)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .037 .088 .057
Observations 22236 23062 23062
The table reports estimated marginal effects (at the sample mean) for the variable “perceived
share of immigrants.” This variable is interacted with dummy variables that indicate whether
neither, one, or both parents of the respondent were born abroad. An asterisk denotes statis-
tical significance at the 5% level. Asymptotic standard errors—adjusted for clustering at the
country level—are shown in parentheses.
Finally, we estimate the model for nationals instead of natives. We look at
natives in our main specification because the questions in the European Social
Survey ask about immigrants (and not foreigners), but a case can be made that
for political decisions it is the attitudes of nationals and not of natives that
matter. In any case, the results (not reported here for the sake of brevity)
are almost unchanged when the model is estimated for nationals instead of
natives.
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7 Conclusion
Using data from the European Social Survey (round 1, 2002/2003), we find
a negative association between natives’ perception of immigration and their
support for the welfare state. But the association is very small and not robust.
This finding is close to the result by Soroka, Johnston, and Banting (2004)
for Canada. By contrast, we find that negative attitudes towards immigrants
are quite strongly associated with less support for the the welfare state inde-
pendently of the perceived presence of immigrants. Finally, we show that the
average effect masks important differences between countries and regions. Ex-
plaining these differences is a promising direction for future work. Of course,
it should be kept in mind that the three dependent variables that we use—the
importance of equal opportunities, and support for helping the poor and for
the government reducing income differences—do not capture the entire range
of attitudes towards the welfare state.
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A Appendix
A.1 Summary statistics
Table 3: Summary statistics: country characteristics
Foreign-born Foreign
Population Actual Perceived nationals
(’000s) (%) (%) (%)
Austria 8102 12.5 20.2 8.8
Belgium 10356 10.7 22.6 8.2
Switzerland 7364 22.4 27.5 20.5
Czech Republic 10203 4.5 8.3 1.2
Germany 82536 12.5 19.4 8.9
Denmark 5384 6.8 10.0 5.0
Spain 41664 5.3 16.1 3.8
Finland 5206 2.5 6.6 1.7
France 61615 10.0 27.3 5.6
United Kingdom 59437 8.3 23.6 4.5
Greece 11006 10.3 19.7 7.0
Hungary 10142 2.9 14.6 0.9
Ireland 3964 10.4 14.3 5.9
Israel 6690 NA 37.7 NA
Italy 57321 3.9 17.7 2.3
Luxembourg 448 32.6 40.0 36.9
The Netherlands 16193 10.1 23.2 4.2
Norway 4552 7.3 12.0 4.3
Poland 38219 2.1 7.2 0.1
Portugal 10408 6.3 22.1 2.2
Sweden 8941 12.0 19.9 5.3
Slovenia 1995 NA 20.4 NA
Sources: Population figures, Gini coefficients, and sharesof social expenditure in
GDP (all for 2003) from Eurostat; shares of foreign-born and foreigners (circa 2000)
from the OECD Factbook 2006; perceived share of the foreign-born in 2002/03 own
calculations from the European Social Survey. For Switzerland, the Gini coefficient
(for the year 2002) is from the Luxembourg Income Study. The population figure
and the share of foreigners are from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. The
population figure for Israel is from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics.
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Table 4: Summary statistics: individual characteris-
tics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Perceived share of immigrants 19.568 17.363 31514
Age 46.504 18.382 37924
Years of education 11.774 3.972 37717
Household size 2.877 1.506 38227
Male 0.477 38270
Net income < 300 euros/month 0.085 30428
Net income 300 to 500 euros/month 0.09 30428
Net income 500 to 1000 euros/month 0.149 30428
Net income 1000 to 1500 euros/month 0.143 30428
Net income 1500 to 2000 euros/month 0.121 30428
Net income 2000 to 2500 euros/month 0.109 30428
Net income 2500 to 3000 euros/month 0.09 30428
Net income 3000 to 5000 euros/month 0.135 30428
Net income more than 5000 euros/month 0.079 30428
Unemployed 0.046 38270
Self-employed 0.123 38270
Armed forces 0.005 33386
Legislators, senior officials and managers 0.081 33386
Professionals 0.133 33386
Technicians and associate professionals 0.156 33386
Clerks 0.116 33386
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 0.144 33386
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 0.048 33386
Craft and related trades workers 0.135 33386
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.078 33386
Elementary occupations 0.103 33386
Child in household 0.395 38270
Married 0.54 38081
Separated 0.014 38081
Divorced 0.064 38081
Widowed 0.091 38081
Never married 0.29 38081
Big city 0.173 38107
Suburb of big city 0.14 38107
Small city 0.295 38107
Village 0.323 38107
Farm 0.069 38107
Austria 0.054 38270
Belgium 0.045 38270
Switzerland 0.044 38270
Czech Republic 0.034 38270
Germany 0.071 38270
Denmark 0.037 38270
Spain 0.043 38270
Finland 0.051 38270
France 0.035 38270
United Kingdom 0.049 38270
Greece 0.06 38270
Hungary 0.043 38270
Ireland 0.05 38270
Israel 0.043 38270
Italy 0.031 38270
Luxembourg 0.028 38270
The Netherlands 0.058 38270
Norway 0.05 38270
Poland 0.054 38270
Portugal 0.037 38270
Sweden 0.047 38270
Slovenia 0.036 38270
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A.2 Correlates of the perceived share of immigrants
Table 5: OLS estimates. Dependent variable: perceived share of immigrants
in the population
Coefficient Standard error
Percent foreign-born 1.1* (.032)
Age -.19 (.094)
Age2/100 .0014 (.00095)
Male -4.6* (.66)
Years of education -.51* (.11)
Net income 300 to 500 euros/month -1.1 (1.1)
Net income 500 to 1000 euros/month -1.4 (1.6)
Net income 1000 to 1500 euros/month -2.6 (1.5)
Net income 1500 to 2000 euros/month -2.8 (1.9)
Net income 2000 to 2500 euros/month -4.3 (2.2)
Net income 2500 to 3000 euros/month -3.5 (1.8)
Net income 3000 to 5000 euros/month -4.3* (2)
Net income more than 5000 euros/month -5.4 (2.7)
Unemployed .055 (1.1)
Self-employed -1.2* (.55)
Legislators, senior officials and managers -.11 (1.1)
Professionals -2 (1.4)
Technicians and associate professionals -.14 (1.6)
Clerks .69 (1.3)
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 3.8* (1.7)
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers .45 (1.5)
Craft and related trades workers 2.7* (1.3)
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 3.4* (1.4)
Elementary occupations 3.7* (1.6)
Household size .39 (.26)
Child in household -.62 (.39)
Separated 2.6 (2.1)
Divorced 1.5* (.39)
Widowed .042 (.58)
Never married -.095 (.51)
Suburb of big city .58 (.95)
Small city -.51 (.59)
Village -1.8* (.81)
Farm -1.6 (1.2)
Belgium 3.9* (.22)
Switzerland -2.2* (.64)
Czech Republic -4.3* (.32)
Germany .58* (.19)
Denmark -2.1* (.67)
Spain 2.6* (.3)
Finland -2.1* (.46)
France 9.1* (.24)
United Kingdom 8.6* (.43)
Greece .12 (.58)
Hungary 2.5* (.86)
Ireland -3.9* (.31)
Italy 5.9* (.44)
The Netherlands 7.4* (.32)
Norway -.55 (.8)
Poland -4* (.78)
Portugal 1.9* (.83)
Sweden .51* (.21)
Constant 22* (2.6)
Adjusted R2 .2
Observations 21434
The table shows coefficient estimates from an OLS regression. The dependent
variable is the perceived share of immigrants. An asterisk denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level. Asymptotic standard errors—adjusted for clustering
at the country level—in parentheses. Omitted reference categories: less than 300
euros per month (for income); armed forces (for occupation); married (for marital
status); big city (for type of settlement); Austria (for the country dummies).
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A.3 Country-specific coefficients on the variable “per-
ceived share”
Table 6: Estimated marginal effects for “perceived share”: results by country
Equal opp. Egalitarian Help the poor
Austria -.0031* .0012* -.0019*
(.000058) (.000078) (.00014)
Belgium .00043* .00047* -.00081*
(.00007) (.00012) (.00012)
Switzerland .00094* -.00049* -.00034*
(.000094) (.00011) (.000086)
Czech Republic .0035* .00087* .0012*
(.0002) (.00018) (.0002)
Germany -.00012* .002* -.00067*
(.000049) (.00012) (.000091)
Denmark -.0011* .0017* .00096*
(.000085) (.00021) (.00018)
Spain -.0011* -.0012* .0013*
(.00014) (.000092) (.000096)
Finland -.00048* -.00044* .0011*
(.000082) (.00017) (.00015)
France .00068* .00053 -.0011*
(.000093) (.00028) (.000098)
United Kingdom -.0015* .00059* -.00066*
(.000076) (.00015) (.000092)
Greece -.0023* -.00069* -.00093*
(.000072) (.00011) (.00012)
Hungary -.0017* -.00061* .0011*
(.000084) (.00018) (.00015)
Ireland .0018* .0023* -.0019*
(.00011) (.00021) (.000052)
Israel .00053* .000061 .0015*
(.000068) (.00012) (.000073)
The Netherlands -.00077* .0022* -.00024*
(.000076) (.00013) (.000096)
Norway -.00051* .00098* .0016*
(.00012) (.00023) (.00012)
Poland .004* -.0009* .00093*
(.00018) (.00026) (.00015)
Portugal -.00095* -.0043* -.0014*
(.000092) (.000083) (.000089)
Sweden -.0014* .0017* .00042*
(.000089) (.00009) (.000098)
Slovenia -.0013* .0026* .00029*
(.000066) (.000076) (.000076)
Italy -.00081* -.0022*
(.00021) (.00013)
Luxembourg .000096 -.00098*
(.000096) (.00013)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 .037 .096 .053
Observations 22236 23062 23062
Results from a probit model in which both the intercept and the
coefficient on the variable “perceived share” are allowed to be
country-specific. The table reports estimated marginal effects
for this variable, calculated at the sample mean. An asterisk
denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. Asymptotic
standard errors—adjusted for clustering at the country level—
are shown in parentheses.
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A.4 Robustness check: different ways of measuring at-
titudes towards immigration
In one of the robustness checks we explore whether our results are sensitive
to how we measure the personal dislike of immigrants and economic concerns
about immigration. In the following we give the wording of questions that we
use; the original variable names from the European Social Survey are given in
parentheses.
A.4.1 Personal dislike of immigrants
Mind imm relative (ImDetMr) “And now thinking of people who have
come to live in [country] from another country who are of a different race or
ethnic group from most [country] people. How much would you mind or not
mind if someone like this married a close relative of yours?”
Undermine culture (ImUEClt) “Would you say that [country]’s cultural
life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from
other countries?”
No imm friends (ImgFrnd) “Do you have any friends who have come to
live in [country] from another country?”
No imm neighbours (IdEtAlv) “Suppose you were choosing where to live.
Which of the three types of area on this card would you ideally wish to live
in?” “An area where almost nobody was of a different race or ethnic group
from most [country] people”
A.4.2 Economic concerns
Take out more (ImBleCo) “Most people who come to live here work and
pay taxes. They also use health and welfare services. On balance, do you
think people who come here take out more than they put in or put in more
than they take out?”
Bad for economy (ImBGEco) “Would you say it is generally bad or good
for [country]’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”
Make unemployed leave (ImUnpLv) “If people who have come to live and
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Table 7: Key to figures 7, 8, and 9
Variable measuring the Variable measuring the
Number economic channel taste channel
1 Take out more Mind imm relative
2 Take out more No imm friends
3 Take out more Undermine culture
4 Take out more No imm neighbours
5 Bad for economy Mind imm relative
6 Bad for economy No imm friends
7 Bad for economy Undermine culture
8 Bad for economy No imm neighbours
9 Make unemployed leave Mind imm relative
10 Make unemployed leave No imm friends
11 Make unemployed leave Undermine culture
12 Make unemployed leave No imm neighbours
work here are unemployed for a long period, they should be made to leave.”
A.4.3 Estimated marginal effects and their standard errors
To explore the robustness of our results, we try all twelve combinations of
the four variables for personal dislike and the three variables for economic
concerns. For each combination we estimate a probit model with support for
the welfare state as the dependent variable and the perceived share of immi-
grants as regressor of interest. As in column 2 of table , this perceived share
is interacted with the four types, abbreviated here as “neither,” “preference,”
“economic,” and “both.”
Since we measure our dependent variable, support for the welfare state, in three
different ways, we have a total of 12×3 = 36 models. The main results of these
36 models are presented graphically in figures 7, 8, and 9. Table 7 explains to
which combination of variables each number in the figure corresponds.
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Figure 7: Dependent variable: equal opportunities
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Figure 8: Dependent variable: reduce income differences
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Figure 9: Dependent variable: support the poor
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